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Book Review: Governance of International Banking: The
Financial Trilemma
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the business model of international banks is under
pressure. Regulators across the world are retrenching to national lines by applying restrictions
on cross-border banking. Applying game theory, this book develops a model of the financial
trilemma to understand the co-ordination failure among regulators. Roger McCormick
finds that the book contains some excellent, succinct case studies of bank collapses in the
crisis.
Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma. Dirk Schoenmaker.
Oxford University Press. April 2013.
Find this book:  
Dilemmas, “trilemmas”…… they can impact at various levels. European
holidays, f or example, are great but, f or many of  us, it ’s always good to get
back home to the UK. Are we behind the times, thinking of  the UK (as
opposed to Europe) as “home”? Does it matter any more?
It’s a wonderf ul thing, this “Europe” that we on our of f shore island kingdom
seem to belong to. Such wonderf ul roads! Great culture! Delicious f ood and
wine! And it ’s all so much easier to appreciate and experience than it was a
f ew decades ago. You almost f eel a part of  it, a cit izen of  Europe! You have
f reedom of  movement, of  capital, of  employment…….Why all the f uss about
“in/out” ref erenda and bailing out those parts of  it that have borrowed more
than they can repay? If  we are so happy about the benef its of  being in the
EU why don’t we play f air, take the rough with the smooth and throw in our lot with our EU
“partners” on the dif f icult issues? Accept joint responsibility with them f or the problems the
eurozone f aces and settle those Greek, Cypriot, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian (French? any
more?) debt problems once and f or all. Have a whip round. There’s enough money there if  we all
pull together. As if  we were one country (sharing the same “home”). Should be easy enough. We
can set up the regulatory architecture, improve democratic accountability (don’t worry about the detail) and
hire clever technocratic leaders (f ormer investment bankers seem to f it the bill) to tell us how much and
when we have to pay (it will be our money that is tapped, you understand).
This book explores the dilemmas (nay, “trilemma”) that f ace us as we seek to enjoy the benef its of  both
increased globalisation and the comf orts of  the old-f ashioned nation state at the same time. The f inancial
crisis has f orced us to see the dilemmas more clearly. Mervyn King’s f amous aphorism, “Global banks are
global in lif e but national in death”, says it all, and, justif iably, starts of f  Chapter 1. However international a
bank’s operations may be, if  it  goes bust, it will be the taxpayers of  individual jurisdictions that must
choose either to bail it  out or f ace up to creditor losses on its insolvency. The rules of  the game at this
point are national, not international. In the UK, we saw this with the f all of  Lehman Brothers, the collapse of
Icelandic banks and the near-collapse of  major (and some smaller) UK banks. Dif f erent solutions were
f ound f or those dif f erent situations, but in all cases the potential impact on us was serious, wherever the
“global” (or not so global) bank originated. There was not too much international co-operation f rom other
governments in helping us address the problems. It was every nation f or itself .
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The
eurozone crisis shows another f acet of  the problem. Member countries A, B, C, etc. have serious f inancial
problems at both sovereign level and (it can be assumed) at the level of  their banks. There is no mechanism
(and certainly no obligation) f or eurozone countries F, G, H etc. to either assist them in any conventional
way or to participate in a eurozone-wide “resolution” of  their banks. The treasuries of  the UK and other
Northern EU members have no democratic mandate f or the transf er (on a non-returnable basis) of  tax
revenues to other countries (or their banks) to “help them out”. And we cannot “resolve” any EU bank in
trouble by employing an EU-based procedure that has no “root” in a national law. We want an ef f ective,
ef f icient and “saf e” banking system in the EU as well as elsewhere, but can that be achieved if  the only
relevant laws that “count” are national, not “global”?
The answer is probably “no”. We all (including the eurozone) may be muddling through right now, but
conf idence in the system is low. So, this book argues, we must f ace up to the “trilemma”. This is,
tradit ionally stated, that it is impossible f or a country to have ef f ective policies f or (1)a f ixed exchange
rate, (2) international capital mobility, and (3) national independence in monetary policy, all at the same time.
Thus, if  a country, wanting to t ighten the money supply, causes its domestic interest rates to increase, that
will result in capital inf lows, which will cause its currency to appreciate and that will in turn f orce it to sell its
currency on the FX markets (reversing the init ial t ightening) if  it  wants to keep its currency competit ive. The
author suggests a restatement of  the problem: that (a) a stable f inancial system, (b) international banking,
and (c) national policies f or supervision and resolution are incompatible. The f inancial crisis has given many
examples of  why our desire f or (a) and (b) f orces us to recognise the need f or compromise on (c). At the
height of  the crisis, much lip service was paid to the need f or international co-operation as a modif ier of  (c)
– and many architectural changes have been implemented (detailed at some length in the book). But, as the
author Dirk Schoenmaker, t ime and time again notes, f rom an EU -based perspective (Schoenmaker has
positions in academia in Holland and with the European Systemic Risk Board and has worked at or with the
Bank of  England, the IMF and the OECD) the “polit ics” gets in the way of  really substantive changes that
would result in countries handing over real power to international agencies in order to regulate international
banks and handle their insolvencies. “Sof t law” mechanisms abound, he observes, but, when push comes to
shove, we need something legally binding…like treaty obligations. (Although the author is perhaps too
optimistic about countries’ inclination to comply with such obligations (which are hard to enf orce) when the
going gets rough).
Chapter 4 contains some excellent, succinct case studies of  bank collapses in the crisis and suggests the
lessons that can be learned f rom them, and also provides a wealth of  statistical inf ormation on the
activit ies of  international banks as well as the international regulatory architecture (which, despite its t it le,
is the book’s f ocus: it is not concerned with the corporate governance of  banks). And, of  course, it makes
a strong case f or a supranational approach to bank regulation. This is particularly pressing in the
eurozone, where the adoption of  the single currency has put participant states in a virtually impossible
posit ion as each state pretends to cling on to f inancial independence even though it has lost control of  its
currency. The f ashionable call f or “banking union” is repeated but no def init ion is of f ered. A pity, given the
EU’s historically casual usage of  the word “union”.
But, as the author seems to recognise, banking union (whatever that is) surely has to lead on to (perhaps
be accompanied by) polit ical union. Disappointingly, this only receives about a page of  coverage towards
the end of  the book, in Chapter 7. Unconvincingly, the author indicates that the solution to the reluctance
of  individual states’ taxpayers to f und economic problems (and, in some cases, gross irresponsibility) in
other states is to go f or “joint sovereignty” since “the construction of  the EU as a democratic polity in
international law allows f or a dif f erent, post-Westphalian approach to the concept of  sovereignty.” EU
states have to “share sovereignty”. But surely, this only restates the problem: how much are we prepared to
“share”? The current trend of  EU, and other international, polit ics suggests “not very much”. Many are
saying (not just f rom the UK) that we have already shared too much. As the author observes on several
occasions, “he who pays the piper, calls the tune”. Crude but apt. If  we are to call the tune, we need to know
that someone (with power) is listening. We may not hold our national polit icians in very high regard, but,
they are at least accountable to us, albeit imperf ectly. In the UK, we rather like the idea of  the House of
Commons keeping the executive in check occasionally. This is not the case with international institutions,
who, all too of ten, seem to behave in a manner that suggests they f eel they are above the concerns and
hurly-burly of  mere “domestic polit ics”, being f ocused on some higher purpose. Maybe, one day, we might
just put it all to a vote?
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